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African swine fever (ASF) is a notifiable infectious disease. The disease is endemic in 
certain regions in Eastern Europe constituting a risk of ASF spread toward Western 
Europe. Therefore, as part of contingency planning, it is important to continuously 
explore strategies that can effectively control an epidemic of ASF. A previously published 
and well documented simulation model for ASF virus spread between herds was used 
to examine the epidemiologic and economic impacts of the duration and size of the 
control zones around affected herds. In the current study, scenarios were run, where the 
duration of the protection and surveillance zones were reduced from 50 and 45 days to 
35 and 25 days or to 35 and 25 days, respectively. These scenarios were run with or 
without enlargement of the surveillance zone around detected herds from 10 to 15 km. 
The scenarios were also run with only clinical or clinical and serological surveillance of 
herds within the zones. Sensitivity analysis was conducted on influential input parameters 
in the model. The model predicts that reducing the duration of the protection and sur-
veillance zones has no impact on the epidemiological consequences of the epidemics, 
while it may result in a substantial reduction in the total economic losses. In addition, 
the model predicts that increasing the size of the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km 
may reduce both the epidemic duration and the total economic losses, in case of large 
epidemics. The ranking of the control strategies by the total costs of the epidemics was 
not influenced by changes of input parameters in the sensitivity analyses.
Keywords: african swine fever, model, simulation, control, surveillance
inTrODUcTiOn
African swine fever (ASF) is caused by ASF virus (ASFV), a DNA virus within the family Asfarviridae, 
genus Asfivirus (1). Since its introduction into Georgia in 2007, the virus spread to several countries 
including the Russian Federation, and several Eastern European Union (EU) countries (2), including 
recently the Czech republic (3). This situation poses a serious risk of spread of ASFV to Western 
European countries (4). Thus, it is important to continuously explore cost-effective strategies to 
control outbreaks of ASF in the industrialized swine populations.
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European Union initially established a set of strategies, 
which should be followed in the case of an outbreak of ASF 
in the domestic swine populations, including the culling of all 
susceptible animals on detected premises followed by cleaning 
and disinfection (5). These strategies were amended later by 
adding extra control actions such as disinfection of vehicles, 
suspension of markets, stricter biosecurity, and other actions 
(6). One of the important actions is the establishment of the 
protection and surveillance zones around the affected herds 
directly after detection, in which all herds with susceptible 
animal species are surveyed (5). The duration of these control 
zones should be at least 45  days for the protection zone and 
40  days for the surveillance zone (6). This long duration has 
negative impact on the intra-community trade (within the 
EU) and export of swine and swine products from the zones 
and from the whole country. However, the EU allows shorter 
duration of the zones, if intensive surveillance within these 
control zones is carried out (5). As the presence of zones has 
a negative impact on the export of swine and swine products 
from the affected countries, it might reduce the economic 
costs of epidemics if the duration of the zones is shortened. 
It is important to ensure that reducing the duration of the zones 
does not jeopardize the epidemiological consequences of the 
epidemics leading to extra economic negative effects. In the 
European Commission African swine fever diagnostic manual 
(5), intensive surveillance is defined as sampling for the detec-
tion of 5% seroprevalence with 95% confidence in each subunit 
of all holdings. An alternative method for intensive surveillance 
of all holdings in control zones was proposed by testing of up to 
five dead pigs per herd per week for detection of ASF genome 
within the control zones (7).
In addition, increasing the size of the surveillance zone might 
improve the control of the disease, as more herds around the 
infected herds are surveyed, and hence the infected ones have 
higher chance to be detected. To our knowledge, this has never 
been explored before.
The objective of this study was to investigate the epidemiologi-
cal and economic impact of shorter duration of control zones with 
or without increasing the size of the surveillance zone during a 
hypothetical epidemic of ASF in an industrialized swine popula-
tion using the Danish swine population as an example.
MaTerials anD MeThODs
herd and Movement Data
We used geographical data (UTM coordinates), the number of 
animals, and specification of herd types for the 8,262 swine herds 
registered in the Danish Central Husbandry Register in 2014. For 
each herd, the daily frequency of outgoing animal movements 
(in batches) was used as the mean (λ) in a Poisson distribution, 
describing the number of daily out-going movements (see Table 
S1 in Supplementary Material). Similarly, the probability of mov-
ing animals to an abattoir was calculated for each herd. Separate 
distributions for movement distances were used to model the 
movements of animals from nucleus herds and from other herd 
types (8).
The simulation Model
The DTU-DADS-ASF model version 0.15.1, which is a buildup 
from the original DTU-DADS model (9, 10) was used for this 
study (8, 11). The model is available at https://github.com/
THalasa/DTU-DADS-ASF. The model runs in the statistical 
computing language R (version 3.1.3) (12). The model included 
a minor update to version 0.15.2. In the earlier version of the 
model, the expected number of dead animals due to other 
reasons than ASF was fixed over time. The update allows vari-
able number of dead animals over time, which is more realistic. 
It also estimated an approximation of the number of submitted 
samples from surveillance of dead animals after the end of the 
epidemics.
Modeling ASF Spread
ASF virus spread was modeled in two processes: (1) spread within 
a herd and (2) spread between herds via several mechanisms.
Modeling ASFV Spread Within a Herd
The infection model for the individual animals is a state transition 
model with the following states: susceptible-latent-subclinical-
clinical-removed (SLSCR model) (11). Infected pigs become 
latent in which virus is not shed. Thereafter, they become sub-
clinical, where they do not show clinical symptoms, but have the 
potential to shed the virus. Once they enter the clinical stage, 
they show clinical symptoms and are fully infectious. 95% of the 
clinical cases die, while the rest survive and become immune. The 
duration of each stage is presented in Figure S1 in Supplementary 
Material. Other parameters related to the disease including the 
transmission rates are presented in Halasa et  al. (8) and Table 
S2 in Supplementary Material. Infected herds follow the same 
dynamics, but with the possibility to become susceptible again 
should the disease fade out. Infected herds may, as explained 
beneath, be detected, and hence culled, or recovered.
Modeling ASFV Spread Between Herds
The virus may spread between herds via animal movements 
between herds, via abattoir trucks, via indirect medium-risk 
contacts (e.g., veterinarians or artificial inseminators with direct 
contact to animals) or low-risk contacts (e.g., feed trucks and visi-
tors with no direct contacts to animals), or via local spread (8). 
For movements of animals (high-risk contacts) to other herds or 
to abattoirs, the frequency of contact (λ) for the individual herds 
was used in a Poisson distribution. For indirect medium (con-
tacts that include direct contact to animals, such as contacts by 
veterinarians) and low (contacts that do not necessarily include 
direct contact to animals such as contacts by feeding trucks) risk 
contacts, the frequency of contact (λ) was modeled for each herd 
type. The probability of transmitting ASFV from the infectious 
herd to the receiving herd was dependent on the prevalence of 
the disease within the infectious herd and the number of animals 
moved in the batch (8). Local spread was modeled for distances 
up to 2 km around infectious herds and was assumed to consist of 
a mixture of unregistered animal movements, shared equipment 
and tools, and spread via rodents and insects. Detailed informa-
tion including the equations and steps for modeling each of these 
mechanisms can be found in Halasa et al. (8).
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The risk of ASFV spread and/or maintenance through wild 
boar was not modeled, as the number of wild boar in Denmark 
is limited due to intensive farming in the country, leaving few 
suitable habitats for wild boar (13, 14). Also, there is a Danish 
legal requirement to eliminate stray wild boar (15).
Modeling ASFV Detection
In the model, the ASFV infection can be detected by three dif-
ferent mechanisms: passive surveillance before first detection; 
passive surveillance after first detection; and active surveillance.
For passive surveillance, before first detection, diagnosis of 
ASFV infection was modeled to occur when (1) the cumulative 
proportion of sick or dead animals (referred to as SIED through-
out the paper) reached 2.55% (8); (2) in the period from the 
appearance of ASF clinical signs until the current time step, the 
proportion of SIED animals relative to the expected cumulative 
mortality level within the herd had increased by 2 (8); and (3) the 
number of SIED animals within the herd reached five animals (8). 
For passive surveillance, after first detection, the first two condi-
tions were assumed to be the same as before first detection, while 
the minimum number of SIED animals was set to 1, to represent 
a higher awareness of the disease in the country (7, 8).
For active surveillance, detection occurred as a result of 
surveillance visits to herds by official veterinarians, either due to 
tracing or because the herd was located in a control zone (7, 8). 
The active surveillance includes either clinical surveillance alone 
(clinical signs and mortality), or clinical surveillance combined 
with serological and/or PCR testing, depending on the control 
strategy modeled. In case of clinical surveillance only, suspicion 
was assumed to occur, if points 2 and 3 (in passive surveillance 
before first detection) were reached. Suspicions were then fol-
lowed up by serological and/or PCR testing for confirmation of 
ASFV (7, 8).
We used these conditions based on the cumulative SIED to 
account mechanistically for the variation in time from infection 
to detection between herds, which is expected to occur due to the 
variation in spread of virus with the infected herds.
Modeling Control Strategies
In our earlier work (7), we have predicted the application of the 
basic EU and Danish control strategies (6, 16–18) combined with 
surveillance of dead animals in herds within the control zones 
(protection and surveillance zones) to be the most cost-effective 
scenario of the compared control strategies. Thus, the basic 
control strategies in this study included: (1) culling, cleaning, 
and disinfection of affected herds; (2) a 3-day national standstill 
on animal movements; (3) establishment of protection zone of 
minimum 3  km and a surveillance zone of minimum 10  km 
surrounding the affected herds; (4) tracing of movements and 
contacts; and (5) surveillance and testing of up to five dead pigs 
per herd per week within the surveillance and protection zones.
Within both control zones, movements must be restricted and 
herds within the zones must be surveyed for ASF. Herds within 
the protection zone were simulated to be visited twice; a first visit 
quickly after establishment of the zone including clinical surveil-
lance only and a second visit before lifting the zone including 
serological testing. Herds in the surveillance zone were assumed 
to be visited only once before lifting the zone, including clinical 
surveillance only. The duration of the protection and surveillance 
zones was simulated to be 50 and 45 days, respectively.
Surveillance and testing of dead animals includes PCR and 
serological testing of one to five dead animals per herd per week 
from all herds in these control zones during the full duration of 
the zones.
In this study, besides the basic control scenario “Basic” that 
is described above, we simulated seven alternative control 
scenarios: (1) The same as “Basic,” but with increased size of 
the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km (“Basic + LZ”); (2) The 
same as “Basic,” but with reduced duration of the protection 
and surveillance zones from 50 and 45 days to 35 and 35 days, 
respectively (“Red.ZD1”); (3) The same as “Red.ZD1,” but with 
increased size of the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km (“Red.
ZD1 + LZ”); (4) The same as “Basic,” but with reduced duration 
of the protection and surveillance zones from 50 and 45 days to 
35 and 25 days, respectively (“Red.ZD2”); (5) The same as “Red.
ZD2,” but with increased size of the surveillance zone from 10 to 
15 km (“Red.ZD2 + LZ”); (6) The same as “Red.ZD2,” but adding 
serological testing of herds in the surveillance zone before lifting 
the zone, instead of clinical surveillance only (“Red.SZ2 + Ser”); 
and (7) The same as “Red.SZ2 + Ser,” but with increased size of 
the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km (“Red.SZ2 + Ser + LZ”).
Model Outcomes and Run
The model provides per iteration epidemiological and economic 
outcomes. The epidemiological outcomes include epidemic dura-
tion, number of infected, detected, surveyed, and culled herds. 
In addition, the model provided outcomes on animal level such as 
the number of culled and surveyed animals. The economic out-
comes include the direct costs, export, and total losses. The direct 
costs included surveillance, depopulation, cleaning and disinfec-
tion, and compensation. In addition, costs of empty stables, costs 
of welfare slaughter, costs of a 3 days national standstill and costs 
of samples submission and analysis for surveillance of dead 
animals were included. The export losses included export bans 
on livestock and livestock products to EU and non-EU countries. 
The losses were calculated for live pigs as well as pig products and 
were divided into losses from export bans on: live swine to EU 
countries, swine products to EU countries, and live swine and 
swine products to non-EU countries. Detailed information on the 
economic analysis and input parameters are presented in Halasa 
et al. (8).
Each scenario was run 2,000 iterations. Following visual 
inspection of model convergence, this number of iterations was 
deemed sufficient to obtain stable outcomes (8).
Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity and robustness analyzes on model input parameters 
were conducted earlier (7, 8, 11) showing a high robustness of the 
model predictions. The analyses identified the transmission rate 
of the virus and the proportion of SIED animals to be potentially 
influential parameters. Thus in this study, we examine, whether 
the ranking by the total costs of the epidemics of the simulated 
scenarios will change following changes in the values of these 
potentially influential parameters by 25% increase or reduction. 
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The original transmission rates of the virus were drawn from 
random PERT distributions with minimum 0.14, mode 0.38 and 
maximum 0.8 for production and nucleus herds, and minimum 
0.36, mode 0.60 and maximum 0.93 for the other herd types (8).
resUlTs
When the “Basic” scenario was simulated, duration of an epi-
demic of 9 days (median value) is predicted, with variation from 
1 to 39 days (5th and 95th percentiles) (Table 1). Furthermore, 
infection of three herds (median value), with variation from one 
to eight herds (5th and 95th percentiles) is predicted (Table 1). 
Most often, all herds were predicted to be detected and culled 
(Table  1). One herd (5th–95th percentiles: 0–3) is predicted 
to be detected via surveillance of dead animals from holdings 
in the control zones. In total, an economic loss of €296 million 
(€258–397 million) is predicted. Reducing the duration of the 
protection and surveillance zones from 50 and 45 days to 35 days 
for both (Red.ZD1) has no impact on the epidemics compared 
to the basic scenario. It would though result in fewer numbers of 
events for surveillance of dead animals and in a substantial reduc-
tion of the total losses due to reduction in export losses (Table 1). 
This was also the case, when the duration of the protection and 
surveillance zones was reduced from 50 and 45 days to 35 and 
25 days, respectively (Red.ZD2). Adding serological surveillance 
for herds in the surveillance zones before lifting the zone to this 
scenario (Red.SZ2 +  Ser) was not predicted to further reduce 
the size, duration, or economic consequences of the epidemics, 
while a substantial increase in the number of samples for serology 
testing was predicted (Figure 1).
An increase in the size of the surveillance zone from 10 to 
15 km is not predicted to improve the control of the epidemics 
and would not pay off the extra costs, under the median situation 
(Table  1). Nevertheless, in case of larger epidemics (the 95th 
percentile), an increased size of this zone is predicted to result in 
slightly shorter epidemic duration, and total costs close to similar 
scenarios with the original zone-size. This indicates that increas-
ing the size of the surveillance zone may be beneficial to improve 
the control of large ASF-epidemics.
The ranking of the control strategies, compared by the total 
costs of the epidemics, is not predicted to be affected by neither 
changes in the proportion of dead animals in an infected herd 
needed for detection to occur, nor by changes in the transmis-
sion rate of the virus (Figure 2). Nevertheless, these changes may 
result in more extreme epidemics, where the losses become very 
large (Figures 2 and 3).
DiscUssiOn
Since the introduction of ASFV to Georgia in 2007, the virus 
spread to the Russian Federation and several European countries 
(2). It also took the attention of the national veterinary authori-
ties of Western European countries, especially those with large 
swine industries, in order to prevent its introduction into the 
countries. Increased emphasis was put on checking and updating 
the national contingency plans for the control of ASFV spread in 
case introduction should occur.
FigUre 2 | Box plots of the predicted total costs of African swine 
fever-epidemics using different control scenarios with changed values of the 
proportion of sick and dead animals (SIED) needed for detection of infected 
herds to occur. The empty, black and gray boxes represent the control 
scenario with the default, reduced and increased SIED value, respectively. 
Basic: (1) culling, cleaning, and disinfection of affected herds; (2) 3-day 
national standstill on animal movements; (3) 3-km protection zone—duration 
50 days + 10-km surveillance zone duration 45 days (movements and 
contact restrictions in zones); and (4) tracing of movements and contacts. 
Basic + LZ: basic control + surveillance zone 15 km (default: 10 km). Red.
ZD1: Basic + duration of protection and surveillance zones 35 days (default: 
50 and 45 days). Red.ZD1 + LZ: Red.ZD1 + surveillance zone 15 km 
(default: 10 km). Red.ZD2: Basic + duration of protection and surveillance 
zones 35 and 25 days, respectively (default: 50 and 45 days). Red.ZD2 + LZ: 
Red.ZD2 + surveillance zone 15 km (default 10 km). Red.ZD2 + Ser: Red.
ZD2 + serological testing in surveillance zone before lifting the zone (default: 
clinical surveillance). Red.ZD2 + Ser + LZ: Red.ZD2 + Ser + surveillance 
zone 15 km (default:10 km).
FigUre 1 | Predicted number of samples (animal-samples) for serological 
testing when different control scenarios against African swine fever-epidemics 
are simulated. Basic: (1) culling, cleaning, and disinfection of affected herds; 
(2) 3-day national standstill on animal movements; (3) 3-km protection 
zone—duration 50 days + 10-km surveillance zone duration 45 days 
(movements and contact restrictions in zones); and (4) tracing of movements 
and contacts. Basic + LZ: basic control + surveillance zone 15 km (default: 
10 km). Red.ZD1: Basic + duration of protection and surveillance zones 
35 days (default: 50 and 45 days). Red.ZD1 + LZ: Red.ZD1 + surveillance 
zone 15 km (default: 10 km). Red.ZD2: Basic + duration of protection and 
surveillance zones 35 and 25 days, respectively (default: 50 and 45 days). 
Red.ZD2 + LZ: Red.ZD2 + surveillance zone 15 km (default 10 km). Red.
ZD2 + Ser: Red.ZD2 + serological testing in surveillance zone before lifting 
the zone (default: clinical surveillance). Red.ZD2 + Ser + LZ: Red.
ZD2 + Ser + surveillance zone 15 km (default: 10 km).
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surveillance of dead animals. These scenarios clearly show that 
the reduction of the duration of the control zones would not 
jeopardize the control actions and lead to extra spread of the 
virus (Table 1). Instead, they would lead to the same epidemio-
logical consequences, but to substantially lower total economic 
losses compared to the basic scenario (Table 1). Because the vast 
majority of the detected herds from surveillance of dead animals 
are predicted to be detected in the first round of testing of the 
dead animals, repeated testing of dead animals does not seem to 
add extra value. This might not be the case in situations with fast 
spreading epidemics of larger size. The reduction in total losses is 
driven by the reduction in export losses (Table 1). Reducing the 
duration of the control zones allows faster recovery of export of 
swine and swine products leading to lower export losses. Adding 
serological surveillance of live animals from herds in the surveil-
lance zone (“Red.ZD2 + Ser”) were predicted to affect neither the 
epidemiological nor the economic consequences of the epidem-
ics (Table 1) and, therefore, has no added value in documenting 
freedom from ASF in control zones. This is consistent with our 
previous finding regarding serological surveillance of live ani-
mals (7). Nevertheless, this would result in a large number of 
Clear regulations have been set by the EU for the control of 
ASF-outbreaks in pig holdings (5), and subsequently amended 
several times based on the recent experiences of the virus spread 
in Europe as discussed earlier (6). The regulations demand 
that the death of swine from herds within the protection and 
surveillance zones is reported and that herds in the protection 
and surveillance zones are surveyed for at least 45 and 40 days, 
respectively, before lifting the zones (5). For logistical reasons, we 
added extra days to each of the zones in the model, to make sure 
that all herds are visited, before the zones are lifted. Nevertheless, 
the regulations allow reduction of the duration of the protection 
and surveillance zones to 30 and 20  days, respectively, when 
intensive surveillance is implemented (5). In our previous work, 
we have shown that including intensive surveillance and diagnos-
tic testing of dead animals from swine herds within the control 
zones improves the control of the epidemics substantially, and 
that testing of live animals would have only marginal impact on 
the control of the virus spread (7). This motivated the proposal 
of a reduced duration of the protection and surveillance zones 
from 50 and 45 days to 35 days for both (“Red.ZD1”) or to 35 
and 25 days (“Red.ZD2”), respectively, which includes intensive 
FigUre 3 | Box plots of the predicted total costs of African swine 
fever-epidemics using different control scenarios with changed values for the 
transmission rate of the virus. The empty, black and gray boxes represent the 
control scenario with the default, reduced and increased transmission rate 
value, respectively. Basic: (1) culling, cleaning, and disinfection of affected 
herds; (2) 3-day national standstill on animal movements; (3) 3-km protection 
zone—duration 50 days + 10-km surveillance zone duration 45 days 
(movements and contact restrictions in zones); and (4) tracing of movements 
and contacts. Basic + LZ: basic control + surveillance zone 15 km (default: 
10 km). Red.ZD1: Basic + duration of protection and surveillance zones 
35 days (default: 50 and 45 days). Red.ZD1 + LZ: Red.ZD1 + surveillance 
zone 15 km (default: 10 km). Red.ZD2: Basic + duration of protection and 
surveillance zones 35 and 25 days, respectively (default: 50 and 45 days). 
Red.ZD2 + LZ: Red.ZD2 + surveillance zone 15 km (default 10 km). Red.
ZD2 + Ser: Red.ZD2 + serological testing in surveillance zone before lifting 
the zone (default: clinical surveillance). Red.ZD2 + Ser + LZ: Red.
ZD2 + Ser + surveillance zone 15 km (default:10 km).
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samples for serological testing (Figure 1). This clearly warrants 
the investigation of resource capacities during an outbreak situ-
ation, including laboratory capacities as carried out earlier for 
FMD (9).
Earlier work has shown that increasing the size of the surveil-
lance zone can improve the control of foot-and-mouth disease, 
as infected herds would be detected earlier and hence extra virus 
spread is prevented (10). This motivated testing the same scenarios 
in this study, but with increasing the size of the surveillance zone 
from 10 to 15 km. In general, because the epidemics are predicted 
to be small, the gain of increasing the size of the zone would not 
pay off the extra costs (Table 1). However, when the epidemics 
are large (as in case of the 95th percentiles), the gain of increasing 
the size of the zone, by having shorter epidemic duration may pay 
off the losses from extra surveyed herds (direct costs). Following 
from that, the increase of zone-size could be seen as an insurance 
against large epidemics.
Previous work have already pointed out the most sensitive 
parameters of the model and showed that model predictions were 
robust (8), and the conclusions regarding the optimal control 
scenarios would not change by changing the input parameter 
values (7). This was also the case in the current study confirming 
the robustness of the model predictions.
The current model can be applied for outbreaks in pig popula-
tions where wild boar are absent as in the case of Denmark or 
where wild boar are not involved in ASF-epidemics as in the 
recent outbreak in Romania (19). However, given the importance 
of wild boar in the spread of ASFV in Europe (6), there is a need 
to further develop simulation models to also include the involve-
ment of ASF-outbreaks in wild boar.
cOnclUsiOn
Reduction of the duration of the protection and surveillance 
zones, implemented during ASF-epidemics, was predicted to 
result in a substantial reduction in the total losses, while the 
epidemics were not affected. In addition, increasing the size 
of the surveillance zone from 10 to 15 km can be an insurance 
against large ASF-epidemics. This was based on simulation of 
ASF spread in an industrialized swine population without a wild 
boar population.
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